It’s not explicitly defined in UNCLOS whether military activities should be permitted,

Meaning there is no provision against it. Article 87 and 58 are both very broad in their protections to any state operating outside of territorial waters, there is no reason to assume the freedom of movement only applies to commercial vessels.

so the debate on military activities within EEZ is still that, a debate.

Only so much that international law in and of itself is still up for debate. If that’s your argument then the notion of international law is moot, and we will be doomed to regress fully back to might makes right foreign policy.

I also feel as if you are attempting to narrow the argument into a specific corridor that suits the Chinese perspective. Yes there are countries that disagree with the broad protections offered by the current international law, but that’s not the only problem China has been rubbing against in regards to LOSC. They aren’t just attempting to govern military movements in their EEZ, they are attempting to expand it, and police the movement of both military and commercial traffic.

I mean, they basically have a paramilitary fishing fleet that aggressively and violently violates other countries EEZ and territorial waters all the time.

reference, it’s mostly the big ex-colonial maritime trading powers that are in support of this because it makes their trade easier, while those countries who exercise coastal rights and natural resource exploration rights are opposed.

I think the point of LOSC is to deescalate points of contentions in spaces where we all have to operate. The rights of freedom of movement serves China just as much as it does the United States.