cross-posted from: https://infosec.pub/post/10908807

TLDR:

If I use SSH as a Tor hidden service and do not share the public hostname of that service, do I need any more hardening?

Full Post:

I am planning to setup a clearnet service on a server where my normal “in bound” management will be over SSH tunneled through Wireguard. I also want “out of bound” management in case the incoming ports I am using get blocked and I cannot access my Wireguard tunnel. This is selfhosted on a home network.

I was thinking that I could have an SSH bastion host as a virtual machine, which will expose SSH as a a hidden service. I would SSH into this VM over Tor and then proxy SSH into the host OS from there. As I would only be using this rarely as a backup connection, I do not care about speed or convenience of connecting to it, only that it is always available and secure. Also, I would treat the public hostname like any other secret, as only I need access to it.

Other than setting up secure configs for SSH and Tor themselves, is it worth doing other hardening like running Wireguard over Tor? I know that extra layers of security can’t hurt, but I want this backup connection to be as reliable as possible so I want to avoid unneeded complexity.

  • Decronym@lemmy.decronym.xyzB
    link
    fedilink
    English
    arrow-up
    2
    arrow-down
    3
    ·
    edit-2
    7 months ago

    Acronyms, initialisms, abbreviations, contractions, and other phrases which expand to something larger, that I’ve seen in this thread:

    Fewer Letters More Letters
    DNS Domain Name Service/System
    IP Internet Protocol
    SSH Secure Shell for remote terminal access
    TCP Transmission Control Protocol, most often over IP
    VPN Virtual Private Network
    VPS Virtual Private Server (opposed to shared hosting)

    6 acronyms in this thread; the most compressed thread commented on today has 10 acronyms.

    [Thread #671 for this sub, first seen 10th Apr 2024, 23:55] [FAQ] [Full list] [Contact] [Source code]